







O'Brien, P. (2013) The American press, public, and the reaction to the 





Copyright © 2013 The Author 
 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format 
or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s) 
 
 


























Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
1. 
The American Press, Public, and the Reaction to the Outbreak of the First 
World War 
Phillips Payson O’Brien 
 
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 was greeted in many of the world’s cities 
with large crowds. Some were celebratory, others tense. The largest gathering held 
anywhere in the world occurred on 4 August and involved up to 400,000 people. This was a 
boisterous celebration, revolving about news flashes about the outbreak of war. Reports 
were posted in large red letters on the sides of buildings and news that the crowd liked was 
greeted with cheers, the largest of which erupted when it was announced that Great Britain 
had declared war against Germany. 
This meeting was held in Times Square in New York City.1 It was not an exception. 
The day afterwards large crowds celebrating the outbreak of war marched up and down 
Broadway. There were gatherings in Herald Square, Greenwich Village, and the upper and 
lower East sides.2 The New York Tribune printed a picture of the crowds which gathered 
outside its offices on Nassau Street.3 The police seemed so worried by the exuberance of 
some that they broke up one pro-Allied mass meeting. By 6 August the Mayor of New York, 
John Mitchel, was so frustrated that he issued a proclamation against further gatherings.4 
These meetings were far larger than the ones held in Europe at the same time. In 
fact recent research has stressed the muted nature of European war enthusiasm.5 The 
‘mass’ demonstrations in front of Buckingham Palace on 3 August involved between 6,000 
and 10,000 people.6 The demonstration held in Berlin at the same time, which received 
great coverage in the German rightwing press, involved 30,000.7 Other German 
demonstrations did not exceed 50,000.8 Throughout Europe it seems impossible to find a 
meeting that would have exceeded 100,000.  
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It is a bit jarring to think that large crowds came out in America to cheer the outbreak 
of war, that there were many Americans who believed that war needed to be celebrated. Yet, 
war had been a constant facet of American life since the outbreak the American Civil War. 
The United States had been involved in a series of protracted and well-covered wars against 
the American Indians in the 1870s and 1880s. Between 1898 and 1904 the country had also 
engaged in a wide-scale and very popular war with Spain and a subsequent guerrilla conflict 
against Filipino insurgents. From 1895 onwards the United States had been involved in 
periodic war scares with other major powers including Great Britain, Japan, and Germany. 
Just before the outbreak of war in Europe, Woodrow Wilson deployed American military 
forces into Mexico. 
   
The study of the American reaction to war is one in which political scientists continue 
to engage in a fascinating conversation. Important scholarship has been recently published 
by (among others) Ole Holsti, Adam Berinsky, Matthew Baum, Tim Groeling, Eric Larson, 
Bogdan Savych, John Mueller, Richard Gelpi, and Peter Feaver. They have created a 
number of different models of American public opinion and war which, even though they are 
based overwhelmingly on evidence gathered since 1945, have relevance for the United 
States in 1914. One of the main questions is to what degree public opinion on war (and 
foreign policy in general) is determined by elite policy makers and institutions such as the 
media. 
For Baum and Groeling, the elite debate is important, but not in and of itself. It is the 
portrayal of the elite debate by the media, how it is framed, that really helps explain how 
Americans react to war and foreign affairs. They argue the famous broadcast by Walter 
Cronkite in 1968, made just after the Tet Offensive, was vital in shaping American opinion.9  
The Johnson Administration’s policies and arguments, meanwhile, were less important.  
Holsti portrays the public as a more active agent in its own decision-making process. Whilst 
he believes that the American public is generally more sceptical about overseas conflicts 
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than elites, he also does not believe that the public needs to be frightened into supporting 
action.10 Instead it can be convinced by more rational arguments about national interest. 
Larson and Savych describe a process that is more variable. To them the public 
chooses to support different conflicts for different reasons. For instance the Clinton 
Administration’s bombing of Kosovo received support from those who were motivated by 
moral more than strategic considerations. When it came to the present war in Afghanistan, 
however, the situation was reversed.11 Berinsky rejects the notion that the American public 
reacts to foreign policy or wars in a way materially different to its reaction to domestic 
questions.12 He argues that much of American reaction is shaped by domestic partisan 
identity or allegiance. Democrats instinctively opposed the Bush administration’s invasion of 
Iraq while Republicans supported it.    
Of all these different visions, the most controversial might be Feaver and Gelpi’s. 
Their argument is that the crucial issue that governs the American response to war is the 
perception of victory.13 They claim that there is a significant part of American public opinion 
that naturally gravitates towards warfare, which they term the ‘hawks’, and that the next 
crucial group is the one that will support involvement in a war if it is seen as winnable. In this 
model those Americans who are swayed by casualty numbers are less influential. If any 
administration can hold together a coalition of the Americans who instinctively support wars 
with those focussed on victory, it will have a comfortable majority with which to work even 
with relatively high casualty levels. 
This relative downgrading of the importance of casualties in swaying public opinion 
has sparked debate.14 Yet it is the kind of analysis that has mostly escaped much of the 
historical study of the American public’s reaction to war. In some cases, such as Niall 
Ferguson’s Colossus the research and thesis are of such poor quality that they are  
irrelevant.15 When it comes to the American reaction to the outbreak of war in Europe in 
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1914, the historical literature is much, much better, but it does tend to assume a great deal. 
The majority of work has been done on individual reaction, particularly that within the Wilson 
Administration and high political figures. Because of this, the picture we have is surprisingly 
uniform. Arthur Link, the dean of Woodrow Wilson scholars, claimed that describing the 
American reaction to the outbreak of war as a ‘shock’ would be an ‘understatement’ and 
added: ‘When war came and the international structure fell crashing in ruins, thoughtful men 
in the United States, indeed, in all the world, were stunned and perplexed.’16 In both 1969 
and 1990 John Milton Cooper used similar language.17 ‘For Americans the war was, in the 
phrase they coined later “over there.” It was a horrible calamity that was happening to 
someone else, far away.’18 
Before 1990 similar sentiments were expressed by Ernest May, Daniel Smith, Patrick 
Devlin, Sean Dennis Cashman, and Neil A. Wynn.19  In the last two decades there has been 
a flourish of excellent writing about America between 1914 and 1917 that has continued to 
portray the American people as stunned and shocked at the outbreak of war, as embracing 
neutrality, and as viewing Europeans war as a terrible thing.  Robert Zieger uses language 
that is almost identical to Link and Cooper. ‘Americans were fascinated and appalled by 
these terrible events. Expressions of gratitude for the existence of the Atlantic Ocean and of 
self-congratulation for America’s traditional stance of non-involvement in European affairs 
were almost universal.’20 David Traxel speaks of Americans ‘great and terrible shock.’21 
Mark Allen Eisner speaks of American popular pressure against war leading Wilson into a 
neutrality position.22 Robert Tucker emphasizes the American people and government’s 
deep reluctance to get involved in the war.23 Alan Dawley has the American people staring 
on in ‘horrified disbelief’ as the European war began.24 Jennifer Keene has the American 
people ‘shocked’, Meirion and Susan Harries discuss claims that Americans had renounced 
the greed of Europeans.25 John A Thompson focuses on progressive political elements that 
were instinctively anti-war.26 Ross Kennedy gives a wider picture. He classifies those 
politicians who favoured preparation for war such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore 
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Roosevelt as ‘Atlanticists’ and compares them to a very strong pacifistic group. In the end 
Kennedy believes that an instinctively pro-Allied Wilson administration had to hide its 
preferences from a strongly neutralist American public.27 
This notion that the American people were instinctively shocked or horrified at the 
outbreak of war is one of the formative assumptions behind one of the more studied aspects 
of the American experience between 1914 and 1917; the impact of propaganda. Thomas 
Fleming, Byron Farwell, Edward Robb Ellis and Alan Axelrod all believe that propaganda 
was crucial in conditioning an anti-war United States public to accept entering the conflict in 
1917.28 On the other hand, the idea that the American public might have a large segment 
that was attracted to conflict, which is such a fascinating part of the ongoing political science 
discussion, is very rare in the present historiography. Yet this runs counter to the first book 
on the subject, Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion, published in 1922.29 Lippmann presents 
the American public at this time as emotional, partly fascinated by war, and one eventually 
entered the First World War with great assurance. His view of human nature and war was 
not positive. ‘...if a war breaks out, the chances are that everybody you admire will begin to 
feel the justification of killing and hating.’30  
In Lippmann’s world the public’s tendency to react emotionally and aggressively had 
to be tempered by foreign policy elites.31 It was the American people who were instinctively 
drawn to war and warfare, and the better educated elites who needed to calm them. The 
most important, and problematic, institution within this model was the press. Lippmann saw 
the press as a crucial agent in setting the national mood over foreign crises, and 
dangerously influential when it acted out of partisan or sensationalist impulses.32  
When looking back at other sources written at Lippmann’s time, it is clear that many 
wanted to portray themselves as being shocked when war erupted in 1914. In 1926 
Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of Agriculture, David Houston, claimed to remember his 
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emotional reaction. ‘Politically, economically and socially, Continental Europe, with the 
exception of a few small countries, is still medieval…’33 The journalist Mark Sullivan, whose 
best selling contemporary history of the United States Our Times, was published in 1933, 
spoke similarly.  
‘Thus—first by brief despatches, flashes of startling news, later by vivid narratives 
and descriptions in periodicals and newspapers, accompanied by photographs of soldiers 
marching, cities ruined, men in trenches, tragedy at sea—thus did America learn of the war. 
It gave rise among us to many moods, expressed in Isaiah-like sermons with Europe’s 
“insanity” as text, pontifical editorials which combed the dictionary for synonyms of 
“senseless”, “barbaric”; man in the street debate, cigar store oraculation.’ 34 
Yet, Sullivan was operating with a memory that at best can be termed ‘selective’. In 
1914 he was the editor of Colliers, a literary and commentary journal with one of the largest 
circulations in the United States, 561,770.35 Colliers was a moderate, Republican publication 
which avoided overtly jingoistic language. Yet Sullivan, in the first editorial he published after 
the outbreak of war, was gleeful at the benefits that the United States would accrue. 
‘A great war in Europe will enable the United States to sell its crops in places which 
will give much greater income than if there was no war. Almost every industry will derive 
more or less advantage….Should the American people take advantage of the golden 
opportunity afforded them by the outbreak of the war, it will mean not diminished but 
increased prosperity for the United States.’36 
A week later Sullivan wrote that as long as the war lasted the United States would 
make a great deal of money.37 By the first week in September he went further. ‘In the past 
and the immediate present, the war, of course, has caused us as a nation some confusion. 
This is being effectively remedied and will soon be in the past. For the future it is possible to 
say, in the words of one of the most thoughtful leaders of American finance and industry, 
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that if he have wise leadership, the permanent result upon American industry and commerce 
of the present European war will be of a beneficence such as to stagger the imagination.’38 
[italics mine]  
In describing the war as a ‘golden opportunity’, Sullivan was far more honest about 
his countrymen’s emotions in 1914 than he would later be in 1933. 
 
A Golden Opportunity 
 
When Woodrow Wilson released his famous neutrality proclamation on 19 August, 
he singled out two institutions as particularly influential in shaping American opinion—God 
and the press. ‘The spirit of the Nation will be determined largely by what individuals and 
society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and 
magazines contain, upon what ministers utter in their pulpits...’39 As such he acknowledged 
the important, if problematic, role that the media plays in affecting or reflecting public 
opinion. For a sceptical Walter Lippmann, the press (or what today we might call the media) 
was a central if not benign institution in determining public opinion.40 Lippmann saw the 
press having great power, he just doubted that the press could accurately portray an 
international situation to a domestically concerned readership. As such Lippmann believed 
the press rarely used its power to lead public opinion down a proper path. 
Of course just speaking about public opinion in this era before opinion polling 
presents its own challenges.41 Lee Benson, who claimed that it was possible if difficult to 
study public opinion before polling, put particular stress on identifying the proper 
contemporary sources and in avoiding recollections.42 Charles Tilly discussed strike and 
protest action, which he believes was becoming increasingly sophisticated by 1914.43 J. 
Michael Hogan also believes that at the time of the war there was a growing belief that public 
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opinion was discernible.44 Research has also been done specifically on the role of 
newspapers and public opinion in this period and much of it supports the Lippmann view. 
Michael Schudson argues that the late 19th and early 20th centuries saw the growth of an 
objectivity agenda amongst American newspaper publishers, as they attempted to supply 
news that was more fact driven and accurate to the public.45 James Hamilton also argues 
that newspapers became more Independent in these years and believes that they often 
mirrored public opinion as a means of appealing to consumers.46 James Carey believes that 
the growth of a more mass oriented newspaper industry after 1890 helped create a stronger 
national ‘audience’.47 Recently Maxwell McCombs argues in his excellent book on public 
opinion that empirical evidence now ‘confirms and elaborates Lippmann’s broad brush 
assertions’ about the agenda setting power of the press.48 
Research on the power of the media today has shown that it is particularly influential 
because of its ability to ‘frame’ the discussion of an issue. Thomas Nelson, Donald Kinder, 
Richard Brody, Robert Entman and McCombs put particular stress on this ability—showing 
how the media uses its power to frame an issue either in line with or in opposition to the 
wishes of presidential administrations.49 This power is particularly strong when there is a 
general media consensus.50 Matthew Baum and Tim Groeling believe that ‘elite’ sources of 
information, including the media, play a crucial role in determining public opinion if these 
sources present a united picture.51 Page, Shapiro and Dempsey maintain that the repetition 
of the stance by the media is crucial in shaping public thought.52 Stuart Soroka believes this 
power is particularly strong in the case of foreign relations, which is outside of most 
American’s personal experiences.53. A problem can occur, however, when this consensus 
breaks down. In that case, public opinion also seems to fracture, with partisan identification 
or sympathy often becoming the lead indicator of how individuals will perceive certain war or 
national security questions. Overall this power of consensus has resonance in other 
arguments such as those of Feaver and Gelpi. If an assumption of victory is important in 
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maintaining public support for conflict, then a media consensus in favour of a war being 
winnable is vital.  
This research has combined an understanding of the present research on framing 
and consensus with a Lippmannite understanding of the role of the media in 
reflecting/shaping public opinion.. Twenty-five daily and Sunday papers were examined in 
detail for this article, as well as 5 major national journals. The newspapers were: 54 
City    Party   Daily Circ  Sunday C 
New York 
American   Dem   277,465  739,844 
Evening Journal  Dem   725,000 
Times    Dem   240,000  175,000 
Tribune   Rep   50,000   50,000 
 
Chicago 
Herald/Examiner  Ind   240,000  580,000 
Tribune   Rep   258,000  867,000 
 
Philadelphia   
Evening Bulletin  Rep   290,325 
Inquirer   Rep   184,958  264,956 




Globe-Democrat  Rep   116,976  159,553 
Post-Dispatch   Dem   171,101  304,523 
Republic   Dem   161,531  106,330 
 
Boston 
Globe    Dem   160,000  300,000 
Herald    Rep   160,000  90,000 
Post    Dem   369,553  286,831 
 
Cleveland 
Press    Dem   171,094 
 
Baltimore 
American   Rep   76,261   101,903 
Sun    Dem   88,458   67,276 
 
San Francisco 




Enquirer   Dem   75,000   215,000 
 
New Orleans 
Times-Picayune  Dem   19,000   82,500 
 
Washington DC 
Post    Ind   30,000   45,000 
Star    Ind   65,954   49,570 
 
Los Angeles 
Herald    Dem   90,410 
Times    Rep   58,019   86,148 
 
Total Circulation     4,358,291  4,906,545 
These papers were chosen to test whether there was a national consensus on the 
outbreak of war and to see how the issue was framed to the American reader. Therefore the 
list starts with at least two papers of different political orientation taken from the seven 
largest cities in the United States (with the exception of Cleveland). These partisan 
identifications were Democratic, Republican or Independent—using the party the paper 
supported in the elections of 1914 and 1916 as a determinant. That means that some papers 
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that called themselves ‘Independent’ in 1914, have been classified here as partisan (such as 
the New York American or the Cleveland Press). In this case the self-styled claim to 
independence was more a vehicle to increase circulation, as these papers strongly 
supported one party. The four papers indentified here as independent were wary of being 
associated with one party. The Chicago Herald, for instance, in the run up to the 1914 
Congressional elections ended up endorsing 11 Republicans, 10 Democrats and 9 
Progressives for the House of Representatives.55 This independence could be very 
important. The San Francisco Examiner, a Republican-Progressive paper, refused to 
support Charles Evans Hughes in 1916, a move that ended up being emblematic of the 
Republicans’ inability to win that state. There was also an attempt to select a range of 
papers with different social targets. The New York American and New York Evening Journal, 
for instance, were owned by William Randolph Hearst and combined had the largest 
circulation in the country. They were openly patriotic and popular in orientation. On the other 
hand, the New York Tribune, with a much smaller readership, was aimed at the Republican 
party ‘elite’.  
Beyond the seven largest cities in the country, particular attention was paid to 
California and Ohio because of their crucial role in the 1914 congressional elections and the 
1916 presidential election. Both were states that usually leaned Republican, but which 
Woodrow Wilson won very narrowly in 1916. If either had voted for Charles Evans Hughes, 
he would have become president. Finally two other cities were chosen, New Orleans as a 
representative of the Deep South and Washington DC, to see if there was a different 
governmental voice on affairs. The journals chosen, Colliers, Harpers Monthly, The North 
American Review, Scribners and The Nation, were mainstream journals, though with some 
political identification ranging from the clearly Republican Colliers to the more traditionally 
liberal Nation. Their circulations were:56 
 Journal Name   Circulation 
13. 
Colliers    561,770 
Harpers    100,000 
Nation     11,000 
North American Review  15,000 
Scribners     150,000 
Total Circulation   837,770 
The combined circulation figure for these newspapers and journals was over 10 
million. In 1910 the U.S. census had the overall national population at more than 92 million, 
so that this figure represents a sizeable percentage of the country’s reading population.  
Within the papers and journals particular attention was paid to three areas. First were the 
publisher’s editorials. Every paper contained an editorial section every day, where the 
paper’s official position was laid out. This editorial usually stressed themes that were 
developed in different news stories on the front page of the paper, working symbiotically with 
them to frame the news. Beyond the editorials, front page and special section news articles 
were examined. Again, these almost always reflected the editorial stance of the paper, but 
sometimes went into greater details about the war situation. Finally, illustrations were 
examined. Many papers ran an illustration, which reflected the editorial stance of the paper, 
on the editorial page or the front page.  
When war broke out in Europe it quickly became the dominant news event, driving 
murder trials and scandals from the front pages. By Monday 3 August most had decided that 
the war was the major story. By Friday 7 August all the papers had run at least one major 
editorial which discussed the conflicts expected impact on the United States. Whilst many 
described the war as a calamity for Europe the overwhelming belief was that the war would 
be hugely beneficial for the United States. 
14. 
Of 24 papers, 16 were soon describing the war as a great opportunity for America.57 
These were the New York American, the New York Tribune, the Chicago Tribune, the 
Chicago Herald, the Philadelphia Record, the Philadelphia Evening News, the St Louis 
Globe-Democrat, the St Louis Republic, the Boston Globe, the Boston Herald, the Baltimore 
Sun, the San Francisco Examiner, the Cincinnati Enquirer, the Washington Post and the Los 
Angeles Times.58 Four papers were more neutral in tone both seeing possibilities but also 
urging restraint. They were the New York Times, Boston Post, New Orleans Times Picayune 
and Washington Star. Only 4 generally presented the war as a real tragedy, some on moral 
but others on economic grounds. They were the New York Evening Journal, the Philadelphia 
Inquirer, Baltimore American and Los Angeles Herald.59 
Those papers which saw the war as a great opportunity were obsessed with taking 
advantage of the conflict to increase American trade, both to Europe and around the world. 
In its most delicate phrasing, such as in this Washington Post editorial, it could be said more 
in sorrow than in anger. ‘Europe is a volcano of racial antagonisms, religious hates, social 
debacles, national jealousies, political plunderings and financial warfares. There can be no 
peace in Europe for many, many years and our intelligent farmers, our shrewd businessmen, 
our enterprising manufacturers have before them the advantages possessed by a land of 
peace in its dealings with a continent divided into warring and quarrelsome races and 
nations. Warring Europe needs our products. Warring Europe weakens our commercial 
competitors in every other continent of the globe.’60 However such restraint was not the 
rule—many papers discussed the profit and trade possibilities with remarkable gusto. The 
New York American, the most read paper in the United States, after days of hammering 
away at the theme, was ecstatic in its calls for government to take advantage of the trade 
opportunities posed by the war.  
‘Action! Action! Should be the watchword and the duty of the American Congress and 
the American People in this great commercial emergency…. 
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TWO THOUSANDS MILLIONS in trade is the prize which world conditions have put 
before the American people. Europe’s tragic extremity becomes, without any working of our 
own, America’s golden opportunity—the opportunity not of a lifetime but of a century of 
national life.’61   
Even the American’s more staid competitors in New York voiced similar sentiments. 
On 2 August, the New York Tribune ran a leading editorial entitled ‘Our Opportunity in South 
America.’62 Two days later, in an editorial entitled ‘A Time for Coolness and Confidence’ it 
prophesized that the war in Europe would make the United States’ position in the world ‘still 
more secure and enviable.’63 
In Philadelphia and Boston, two other northeastern cities with large trading interests, 
similar sentiments were expressed by the majority of papers. On 3 and 4 Augustthe 
Philadelphia Record published editorials discussing the profits to be made by foreign trade, 
particularly from a rise in commodity prices.64 The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin was even 
more confident when it editorialized on 4 August that the United States could use the war to 
improve what had always been a statistical weakness in the American economy, its negative 
foreign trade balance.  
‘…the United States is well prepared, and is in a position to be master of the 
situation, to check the outflow of gold, and to secure the return of that which has gone in 
payment for its wheat and other supplies which Europe must have.’65 
In Boston the language was even more evocative. On 3 August the Boston Globe 
published a major article headlined ‘United States due for Boom: Federal Officials Happy at 
Prospect’ and two days later they trumped this by publishing a major piece headlined ‘Wall 
Street still Hopeful: Europe Must get our Exports or Starve.’66 Later, the Globe wrote an 
editorial that demonstrated the emotional conflict that existed between those who wanted to 
condemn war, but on the other hand looked forward eagerly to the economic windfall that 
this war promised. 
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‘No American citizen worthy of the name would prolong the terrible international 
conflict a single moment for the sake of profits, but there is much legitimate business crying 
to be done and it is up to us to do a large share of it.’67 
The newspapers of the Midwest were just as enthusiastic about improving trade but 
usually didn’t feel it necessary to provide any moral disclaimer before profit. This was partly 
because the war offered particular help to Midwestern farmers, who due to the beautiful 
weather of the summer of 1914, were on course for a bumper year of food production.68 The 
Chicago Herald editorialized on 3 August that the war would increase demand for 
Midwestern grain.69 The Chicago Tribune was even more vociferous. On 10 August 10 the 
Tribune published an article by the respected head of its Washington DC Bureau, Arthur 
Sears Henning, with the headline ‘War May Bring Big Boom to the US: Exporters, Shippers, 
Farmers and Clothes Makers Face Windfall.’70 Henning, claimed that all the moralizing of 
Congressmen against war quickly gave way to a rush to gain trade advantage. He described 
how senatorial speeches focussed on improving market conditions, that the senate 
immediately passed a trade commission bill, and that other such measures ‘will be passed 
with equal dispatch if the war excitement keeps up.’71 On 9, 10, and 11 August the Tribune’s 
editorial page hit its stride as it published a sequence of stories and editorials about the trade 
opportunities war presented, particularly for agriculture.72 To see the breadth of the pro-trade 
stories, an entire page of the Tribune, both stories and an illustration, was devoted to the 
subject on 11 August (see picture A). 
The lead given by the Tribune, perhaps the Midwest’s most important newspaper and 
one of the top Republican papers in the country, was aped by papers of both parties in 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, and St Louis. The very pro-Democrat Cleveland Press editorialized; 
‘…the great central community in the United States, which has its nerve center in Chicago, 
has decided to lose no more time in hooking up to Opportunity’ and praised the scouting 
parties that were supposedly on their way to South America to capture markets previously 
dominated by Europeans.73 The Cincinnati Enquirer stands out for the sheer number of 
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articles extolling the trade advantages of war. It published editorials urging Americans 
forward on 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 31 of August!74 
The Enquirer’s tone was celebratory. The war was America’s ‘Opportunity’ and the country 
was urged to go ‘Full Speed Ahead.’75 
St Louis presented an equally united picture, which is important as it portrayed itself 
as a place with both Midwestern and Southern roots. The St Louis Globe Democrat, a 
moderate Republican paper, has the distinction of running on 3 August the first major 
cartoon about the economic benefits of the war for the United States—entitled ‘The Certain 
Rich Man.’76 On the same day the pro-Democrat St Louis Republican ran two major 
editorials, one on the need to boost foreign trade and the other entitled America’s 
‘Opportunity.’77 Why this is interesting is that the Deep South, as represented by New 
Orleans, seemed worried. Relying on cotton exports instead of food, the picture from New 
Orleans was initially far less optimistic. Whilst it was assumed that Europeans would have to 
buy lots of grain to kill themselves, their need for raw cotton was less certain. On 3 August, 
4, and 5 the Times-Picayune published editorials and major news stories about the 
economic threat posed by the war.78 However on August 6th they changed tack dramatically 
and ran a front page cartoon with a smug Uncle Sam, entitled ‘Good News from the Front.’ 
(See Picture B). From that point on the Times-Picayune’s reporting both mentioned the 
general trade advantages posed by the war, but also the particular problems of the cotton 
industry. 
Baltimore was an example of another southern city whose press hedged its bets at 
first. The Baltimore Sun was mostly upbeat. Between 5 and 12 August they published five 
editorials on the possible economic advantage of the war.79 Their editorial on 12 August was 
entitled ‘A Great National Opportunity.’  
‘Until a few days ago we realized mainly the inconveniences and indirect dangers 
which the European War involved for this country. But we are now beginning to perceive that 
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it offers us the greatest business and commercial opportunity that has been presented to us 
for several generations—an opportunity not simply for makeshifts and expediencies of a 
temporary character, but opening the way for permanent results and new and lasting trade 
conditions.’80 
The Baltimore American, a Republican paper, was initially very pessimistic in its 
reporting on the war, on both moral and trade grounds.81  It even published some striking 
anti-war cartoons. However, this tone began to break down quickly. Looking at the main 
editorial cartoons published by the Baltimore American on 5 August, 10 August, and  15 
August, this evolution is clear.82 The first (Picture C) was an anti-war piece dwelling on the 
sadness of death. The second (Picture D) was published to reassure Americans about their 
strength and security. The last (Picture E) was openly enthusiastic about the war, using a 
sporting metaphor to urge Americans to take up the trade opportunity. 
California also presents a split picture. The Los Angeles Times and the San 
Francisco Examiner quickly adopted the ‘war-as-opportunity’ position. On 3 August the 
Republican-supporting Times, opined; ‘The United States must feed and clothe Europe: Now 
is the time to get busy and raise things. Our Industries will hum and big money will be 
made.83 By late August the paper was publishing special reports in its large Sunday edition 
outlining the huge benefits that the war was soon to bestow.84 The Examiner, generally 
Republican, though strongly progressive, was equally effusive.85 On 8 August its lead 
editorial was titled ‘The Mighty Prize War Brings to Us.’ ‘…the United States will be the 
department store of the world, with its shelves loaded with goods and other nations 
clamouring to buy at its counters.’86 
On the other hand, one of the most pessimistic papers was also in California, the Los 
Angeles Herald. The strongly progressive Herald continued to describe the war in bleak 
terms until 23 August. Before that date, with growing frustration, it attacked those that 
believed the war would be an ‘unmitigated blessing’ (it is fascinating that it felt the need to do 
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so as early as 7 August).87 They also published a series of the bleak anti-war cartoons. 
However, by 23 August even they felt the need to portray the impact of the war in positive 
ways in an editorial entitled ‘Made in the United States, The Familiar Label.’88  
The Herald’s story of conversion was mirrored closely in the other papers that did not 
rush to hail the fighting in early August such as the New York Times, New York Evening 
Journal and Philadelphia Inquirer. Like the Herald these papers were flummoxed at the 
amount of celebratory rhetoric they encountered at the outbreak of fighting. On 11 August  
the New York Times felt it necessary print a lead editorial scolding those voicing satisfaction 
at the European conflict.  
‘We note some disposition...to look upon the war in which nearly all Europe is 
engaged, and which may extend to the Orient before it is ended, as an opportunity for the 
United States to reap large advantages that would not in other conditions have been 
available.’89  
The position of the New York Evening Journal is particularly interesting. The sister 
paper of the New York American, the Journal had the largest daily circulation in the country. 
For the first few weeks of August 1914, it refused to dwell on the great opportunities war 
presented. It was not until 19 August that it changed tone, publishing a lead editorial entitled 
‘The Big Chance for the United States’ one it followed three days later with a larger piece 
titled ‘War, Sad as It Is, Means Marvellous Business Opportunity for the United States.’90  
At exactly the same time the New York Times started lustily expressing the 
sentiments it had warned against earlier. On 18, 19, and 22 August it published three 
editorials calling for measures to support American overseas trade.91 On 31 August the lead 
editorial was entitled ‘The War and Our Prosperity’. 
‘The country is so fortunate that it is thinking chiefly about how the war will affect its 
material interests, while our unhappy foreign friends are thinking about problems of national 
existence and individual sorrows beyond any money considerations. Relatively the United 
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States is the most fortunate country in the world.’92 This unanimity of view from New York by 
the end of August is interesting because the New York Stock Exchange still closed. On 31 
July, just as the war began, trading was halted to stop what was expected to be an outflow of 
European money from the United States back to the home countries to finance the war 
effort.93  
By the end of August 1914 there was practical consensus amongst the American 
newspapers examined here that the war was first and foremost a great economic opportunity 
for the United States. A majority came to that conclusion within the first few days of fighting, 
whilst it took the rest a few weeks longer. The reaction by weekly and monthly journals 
mirrored this consensus, though because of their print schedules it often took them longer to 
engage with the question. The sentiments expressed in Colliers quoted earlier, were echoed 
widely. In November, Scribners published a major piece by A. Barton Hepburn, Vice 
President of the Chase National Bank entitled ‘The Trade Opportunities Facing the United 
States’.94 The North American Review in its September edition (the first published since the 
outbreak of the war) printed back to back a lead editorial and a main article about the trade 
benefits the conflict offered the United States.95 Another article later in the edition even 
complained that Americans, instead of being shocked or horrified by the war, were not taking 
the conflict seriously enough.96 By the end of 1914 the supposed economic benefits that the 
war offered the United States were considered so important that different lobbying groups 
started paying for advertisements calling for coordinated action. Harpers Monthly, in its 
November edition, published an advertisement from the Quoin Club and the National 
Periodical Association, claiming to speak for a veritable who’s who of American mainstream 
magazines including: The American Magazine, Atlantic Monthly, The Century, Colliers, Good 
Housekeeping, Harpers, The Literary Digest, National Geographic, and Scribners.97 The 
advertisement had three main points; the dollar needed to be made more elastic so that it 
would be easier for the USA to trade, a way had to be found to get American crops to the 
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warring nations, and with the Panama Canal just opened the USA should act quickly to 
replace European trade in South America. 
 
The War and American Intervention 
 
What seemed to be lacking in America was a widespread anti-militarist perspective. 
The general American news reporting of the war in its early stages was rather breathless 
and dramatic, often portraying the war as a gigantic sporting event. Most of the papers hired 
military ‘experts’ who would digest the cables coming from Europe and determine who had 
won or lost the previous days contests. They even published stories deliberately to point out 
the humorous side of the war. On the first day of the war the Boston Herald reported that the 
city might experience a severe waiter shortage A headwaiter at one of Boston’s leading 
restaurants complained; ‘The war is a great trouble. The men won’t attend to business. They 
talk and talk….Two of them, a German and a Frenchman, got to fighting. They would have 
broken all the china in the place, only they were separated by a Swiss.’98 A few days later 
the Boston Globe reported that with the notable exception of the head chef of the Harvard 
Club, a Frenchman named Arthur Haltcoeur, very few members of the city’s kitchen staffs 
felt drawn to lay down their utensils and join in the combat.99 In New York there was a great 
deal of concern over toy imports. Germany toymaking, centred in the town of Nuremberg, 
was a world leader and dominated the American toy trade.100  
Of course American war reporting was not regularly frivolous—but nor was it 
regularly one of sober condemnation. This also brings up the question about different 
positive pictures that were put forward about the impact of the war. One of the most powerful 
of these was the refrain from the more progressive elements in the American press that the 
war could lead to a positive transformation in European governance. Journals such as the 
Nation and Harpers, which spent the most effort condemning the futility of war, admitted that 
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the First World War offered the possibility of a great progressive leap forward.101 In the first 
edition assembled after the war began, Harpers’ lead editorial optimistically prophesized that 
that the ‘release of this awful tension may prepare the way for a natural solution, through the 
breaking of very hollow shell of national pride and the elimination of all restrictions to the free 
play of constructive national activities, and especially of all restrictive patriotisms.’102 The 
New York Times also frequently argued that the war could bring positive change. On 5 and 6 
August it published editorials arguing that war now could bring benefits later—the first 
entitled ‘Peace Through War’ and the second ‘Through Evil Good May Come.’103 The war 
was the dying gasp of a backward, aristocratic Europe; one that was destined to be replaced 
by a more modern, democratic continent—more like America.  
One element in this critique was that the war was mostly the fault of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. When fighting commenced, most major American papers tried to affix 
blame. This was a delicate task in an ethnically diverse country, even for northeast papers 
that were openly supportive of Great Britain and France. Though Germany was often seen 
as the pivotal power in the war, most American papers were reluctant to blame the 
Germans, therefore Austria became the culprit. The Boston Globe, New York Times, and 
Washington Post all laid the blame squarely at the feet of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.104   
Papers in the Midwest, where the largest numbers of German-Americans lived, were 
also critical of Austria-Hungary, but tried even harder not to portray Germany in a negative 
light. On 1 August the Cleveland Press claimed that it was Austria’s desperate, irrational, 
desire to control Serbia that was the underlying reason for the crisis.105 Yet, the Press went 
out of its way to present Germany’s efforts in a completely different light. On 8 August they 
published a feature article on German Kaiser Wilhelm ‘As He Is.’ The German Emperor was 
portrayed as both physically and morally ‘brave’ and the correspondent predicted that under 
his wise military leadership Germany would make a splendid effort.106 On 27 August, the 
Press’s lead editorial was a bitter attack on those who were spreading stories about German 
atrocities.107 
23. 
‘...we advise our readers to be slow to believe a tenth part of the charges and 
counter-charges that have been or will be made of atrocities in the war’s wake….A little while 
ago, for example, we were reading daily reports of how brutally German officials and soldiers 
were treating American tourists caught in the war tide. But it turns out that not only were 
these tales false, but the reverse was true—practically every American returning from 
Germany tells of the exceptional courtesy and kindness with which Americans were treated 
there….So now, when we read tales of alleged German brutalism in the wake of the army’s 
march, we accept them—NOT.’108  
The Chicago Tribune was also careful to differentiate between the behavior of 
Germany and Austria. On 1 August it blamed a backward, ‘dynastic’ Austria for the war’s 
outbreak.109 Yet Germany was seen in a very different light, one of deep respect. The 
Tribune quickly came to the conclusion that Germany, surrounded on all sides by hostile 
enemies stood very little chance of emerging victoriously from the war. In that case, German 
efforts would have to be almost superhuman.  
‘Merely as a piece of military confidence, Germany’s challenge of Europe is 
wonderful…Germany has not yet her back to the wall, but she has enemies on all sides. 
German efficiency may be the equivalent of legend. If so, that efficiency is more than human. 
Such odds have never been accepted before.’110 
The Chicago Tribune’s position was also important not only because it was one of 
the most important paper’s in the country, it was one of the most interventionist and was 
keen to stress the moral benefits of war in general. On Sunday 9 August they praised the 
national spirit that war can bring in a lead editorial entitled ‘War Virtues in Peace.’  
‘In the mighty crisis of war a nation will rise to heights of sacrifice, to achievements of 
united action, to triumphs of heroic energy which, if they were matched in time of peace for 
the ends of civilization would work miracles of progress. This must be an insistent thought for 
us in America who are able to watch the tremendous phenomenon of war as bystanders 
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merely. We deplore the waste, the agony of this monster combat. We marvel at what seems 
to us its insane want of justification. But we cannot, we ought not, to close our eyes to its 
revelations of desperate strength, of devotion stronger than death, of loyalty to ideas of 
sentiments which cannot shatter, of a brotherhood which the sword cannot cleave.’111 
This sentiment was indicative of the belief of others that the United States might have 
to join in the war. Theodore Roosevelt, who shared the Tribune’s belief that war could be a 
force for moral improvement, was just one of many who started calling for preparedness in 
case the United States had to fight.112 The issue of American intervention took a serious turn 
very early in the process when Japan joined the Allies in late August. Anti-Japanese 
prejudices were widespread in the United States, particularly on the West Coast. In 1906 
San Francisco even passed a regulation calling for the separate education of ‘Oriental’ 
children to protect white children from having to be educated beside those of the ‘Mongolian’ 
race.113 Acts such as these were particularly offensive to the Japanese government and 
periodically in the years before 1914 their reactions would lead to talk about war between 
America and Japan. 
When, therefore, the Japanese entered into the fighting and began conquering much 
of the German Empire in the Pacific, this was seen as a decidedly threatening development.  
The Los Angeles Times was, not surprisingly, one of the first to point out the problems for 
the entente powers that could result from Japan’s entry. On 21 August, in a lead editorial 
entitled ‘Embarrassing Friendship’, the Times described the acute dilemma that now 
confronted Britain because of Japanese actions.114  
Such sentiments were not limited to the west. The Boston Post believed that the 
United States had a legitimate national interest in stopping the Japanese from using the 
declaration to seize more territory and mocked the Japanese statement that they were there 
to keep the peace.115  Other papers, like the St Louis Globe-Democrat, felt worried enough 
by the rise in anti-Japanese sentiment, that they warned their readers against agitating for 
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the United States to join the fighting.116 They certainly had reason to be concerned as other 
papers argued that Japanese intervention might lead to American entry. Not surprisingly the 
most bellicose was the Chicago Tribune which openly wondered if Japan’s belligerence 
should lead to America joining the war. 
‘We were never so devoted to peace. We never saw the glories of militarism flattened 
into a sodden mass; but with every consideration urging us to peace we must recognize the 
obligations of one generation to another. No Coward exists whose state is so contemptible 
as the one who involves a dependent in dangers in order that he may be so secure….We 
may hope that nothing will be done or left undone by this generation of Americans which, 
because it was done or not done, bequeathed a burden to the next.’117 It seems interesting 
that this intervention-scare occurred at precisely the same time that Woodrow Wilson issued 
his neutrality proclamation. It was released the day after the Boston Post and St Louis 
Globe-Democrat editorials and just a few days before the Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles 
Times editorials.  
The other moment when American newspapers pondered intervention happened in 
October, when it seemed that Germany might win the war. At that point pro-Allied papers, 
particularly in the Northeast openly contemplated whether the United States should soon join 
in the combat. The particular issue that first caused discussion was Germany’s threat to the 
Monroe Doctrine. The German Ambassador to the United States, Count Bernstorff, who was 
not prone to diplomatic restraint, foolishly (and honestly) answered a question about 
Germany’s rights to attack Canada. Seeing as there was a Canadian force on European soil 
fighting against the German Army, Bernstorff refused to dismiss the notion entirely that 
Germany had the right to attack the dominion. To the papers in Boston this was an 
extraordinary affront to American diplomatic prestige. On 27 October the Boston Herald 
wrote an editorial calling attention to Germany’s possible threat to the Monroe Doctrine, 
while on 28 October the Boston Globe threatened military force.118 
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While this storm over the Monroe Doctrine ended up occurring in a regional teacup, it 
is another indication that some in the press were not shy in calling for the use of American 
force from the moment that the war erupted. Far from simply embracing neutrality and urging 
that the nation take every step to avoid hostilities, many realistically discussed the use of 
American force.  
  
The 1914 Election 
The final way to examine the American reaction to the First World War is to look at 
the reporting of one of the most interesting Congressional elections in American history. 
Congressional elections are often treated like the embarrassing relations of American 
politics. The 1914 election, however, was one of the most exciting in American history. In 
1912 America’s two-party system had fractured for the first time in 60 years and a new 
political party, the Progressives, has entered into the fray. Because of the tripartite split, the 
Democrats had rolled up huge majorities in the House of Representatives, with 292 
members compared to 132 Republicans and 9 Progressives. The 1914 elections were 
therefore to test whether the Progressives could survive and whether the Democrats could 
maintain their strength. In that sense it was a true three party contest (the last in American 
history to this day). Both of the older parties had particular concerns. Many of the 
progressive voters had been disaffected Republicans who had followed the charismatic 
Theodore Roosevelt and the GOP was desperate to get them back The Democrats, 
however, wanted to gain the mantle of the most ‘progressive’ party and were determined to 
steal away as many ‘Progressive’ voters as possible. They pointed to the raft of legislation 
they had passed on different economic issues since 1912. It was also a fascinating election 
because of the growth of popular voting for the senate. Until 1914 many senate seats 
remained the preserve of state legislatures and they were now in the hands of the popular 
voter. The Chicago Tribune’s chief Washington correspondent, Arthur Sears Henning, 
summarized the importance of the election admirably. 
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‘The election today is distinguished by many unusual features, and brings to a close 
one of the most remarkable political campaigns in American history. Never before have the 
people beheld candidates for the United States senate, long the bulwark of corporation rule, 
going up and down the country intent upon winning the confidence of the voters....Never 
before—in the memory of this generation at least—has a foreign war produced a profound 
influence upon a political contest.’119 
He was not alone in wondering what the impact of the war would be on voting. 
Wilson and the Democrats had, for more than a month, tried to nationalize the election and 
turn it into a referendum on the President’s policies, including that on the war. Wilson took 
the rather precipitous decision to issue the annual presidential Thanksgiving proclamation a 
full month before the holiday, though only a few days before the election. He crowed openly 
about the war’s economic benefits for America and commended his neutrality and ‘peace 
with honor’ stance. ‘Our crops will feed all those who need food; the self possession of our 
people amidst the serious anxieties and difficulties and the steadiness and resourcefulness 
of our businessmen will serve other Nations as well as our own.’ 120 
On the campaign trail, Democrats were equally unsubtle. The New York Times 
reported favorably on Secretary of War Lindsey Garrison’s stump speech centring on the 
claim that the President’s policy was saving the country from bloodshed and carnage and 
that to vote against the President’s party at this moment of crisis would seriously weaken the 
nation’s prestige and international standing.121 It was a theme that was echoed by 
Democrats around the country. Roger Sullivan, the Democratic Candidate for U.S. Senate 
used his attachment to Wilson’s peace policy as a major plank of his campaign.122 It was 
also one of the most important issues used by the Democrat-supporting press in their 
election endorsement editorials. The Cleveland Press, one of the most partisan Democratic 
papers in the Midwest, constantly played up the benefits of Wilson’s war policy.123  They 
were joined in this by the Boston Post, Philadelphia Record, Boston Globe, Baltimore Sun, 
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and the St Louis Republic.124 The latter devoted a large section of its endorsement editorial 
to the virtues of Wilson’s war policy. 
‘Beneath all the discussion of the tariff, the currency conservation, trust control, one 
central current of feeling runs through the hearts of the American people today—
thankfulness to the God of nations that we are at peace with all the world….in Washington, 
by a desolate fireside, sits a man, burdened with the care of one hundred millions, whose 
wisdom, balance, and self-possession, whose sense of the priceless value of peace and the 
strength of national self-control has made the difference for us, between the fair and smiling 
land which is ours and an inferno of war, with carnage at the battle front and want and 
weeping at home.’125  
There were also a number of stories in both Democratic and Republican papers 
which discussed the beneficial impact of the war. The Los Angeles Times on 11 October 
reported how the western mining states were benefitting from the steep rise in the price of 
gold and other ores.126 The New York Times published a front page piece on 10 October 
about how Europe’s need for American loans had lead to a governmental shift so that gold 
would now be treated as tradable commodity.127 The Boston Herald stressed the positive 
impact of the war in its pre-election editorial ‘Big Trade in War Goods.’128 Even those 
Democratic papers which had originally not embraced the fighting in August were now 
comfortable discussing the issue. The New Orleans Times Picayune ran a very confident 
cartoon on the subject the day before the vote. (Picture F). The Republican press was more 
than aware of this Democratic tactic and tried to de-nationalize the election. Many of the 
Republican paper endorsement editorials never even mentioned the war, benefits or 
otherwise.129  Instead they talked about the vote as an opportunity for re-establishing 
Republican party unity after the disastrous split of 1912. Republican papers also talked 
about limiting the Democrats almost unchecked powers in domestic life.130  
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Before the vote, most of the Democratic press seemed confident that Wilson’s 
record, including that on the war, would help minimize losses in the House of 
Representatives. The Philadelphia Record on 1 November urged Pennsylvanians to support 
the President. ‘The finest piece of work that can be done Tuesday is to put the Keystone 
State in the Democratic column. It would cheer President Wilson and strengthen his position 
in his own country and in the world as nothing else would.’131 The Baltimore Sun ran a 
cartoon entitled ‘Stand by Woodrow’.132 The Boston Post made it perfectly clear that it 
believed voters should support the Democrats because of Wilson’s position on the war. ‘It 
(Democratic party) ought to be supported because support will be an indorsement of 
President Wilson.’133 
When the dust had settled, this plea seems to have fallen (mostly) on deaf ears. In 
1914 the Republicans gained 64 seats, slashing the Democrat majority to 230 to 196. A 
large number, but not all, of the progressives who had deserted the Republican party in 1912 
returned to the fold. Many of the Republican gains came from the return of progressive 
voters in the vital swing states, as they gained 12 seats in Illinois, 12 in New York, 11 in 
Pennsylvania, and 9 in Ohio.134  To much of the press it was clear, Wilson and the 
Democrat’s attempts to make the war an issue had failed. The Washington Post, along with 
the Chicago Herald one of the least partisan papers in 1914, remarked that, contrary to 
many expectations, the war was not the main issue in the campaign.135 Once the voting had 
been completed they criticized the Democrats for ‘foolishly’ trying to make the election an 
endorsement of Wilson’s war policy.136  
Other papers, if not willing to go this far, ended up seeing the war as mostly irrelevant 
in determining who Americans voted. The New York Times, worked hard to put a positive 
spin on the results. 
‘Mr Wilson has not altogether escaped the penalty of success which the country so 
often visits upon a President in the second year of his term. Even though he has shown and 
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maintained master over a fractious Congress and has shaped its action to his will, even 
though he has in less than two years carried through a programme of legislation unequalled 
in variety, scope and importance in the record of any other President’s complete term...the 
verdict is not favourable to him or his party.’137 
The war in Europe hardly figured in the New York Times analysis—and this was the 
rule in the country. Election summary editorials in Democratic and Independent newspapers 
in Boston, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco saw the war playing little or 
no role in how Americans voted.138 When it was included, the war was portrayed as 
damaging the Democrats.139 Republican papers in the northeast and Midwest, meanwhile, 
were invigorated. They described Democrat attempts to make the vote a referendum on 
Wilson and his war policy as a disaster that backfired. Some even said that the Democratic 
losses were because the President had been too slow to help American businesses take 
advantage of the war.140  
The President personally did not need a newspaper to provide him with the analysis 
that this election was not an endorsement of his policies (either foreign or domestic). 
Reading the election results with his closest friend, Colonel Edward House, Wilson was 
despondent. 
‘He (Wilson) spoke of the result of the recent elections, and was distressed because 
it seemed hardly worth while to work as hard as he had worked during the past two years 
and have it so stantly [scantily] appreciated. I tried to console him by stating that he was not 
running and they were voting for others and not for him. He replied ‘People are not so stupid 
not to know that to vote against a democratic ticket is to vote indirectly against me….He 
seemed thoroughly weary and heartsick…’141  
In all honesty, Wilson was being melodramatic. The election results were not a 
repudiation of his policy, at least as regards the war in Europe. The American voter did what 
he had almost always done before that time, voted on local and economic issues.  However, 
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if it did not represent a repudiation of the president’s policy, it also demonstrated that very 
few Americans believed that they needed to endorse a neutralist war policy.  
 
Conclusion 
In the end an examination of the press does provide a new perspective on the 
American reaction to the outbreak of war in 1914. The most important points are: 
1) There was a strong consensus from the end of August through the congressional 
elections in November, that the war was primarily an economic opportunity for the 
United States. The outbreak of war was framed in this way for readers of 
Democratic, Republican and Independent newspapers and magazines from all 
the cities studied. 16 of the 24 newspapers studied adopted this position by the 
end of the first week, with the rest coming around by the end of the month. This 
was seen in their editorials news articles and even illustrations and the notion of 
the war being a great opportunity grew in intensity over time. 
2) The idea that Americans were mostly shocked or appalled by the outbreak of war 
misrepresents the complexity of their reaction. While there were regular 
expressions about the horror and tragedy of war, these declined as time 
progressed. On the other hand, many Americans were much more excited than 
shocked and followed the course of the war eagerly.  
3) Politically, appealing to the American people to support Wilson’s war policy was 
ineffective in 1914. During the Congressional campaign the Democrats tried to 
turn the vote into a national referendum in support of Wilson’s policies, including 
that on the war. This policy seems to have failed.  
Looking at 1914 from this perspective is important and it leads to further questions 
about the United States in the neutral period. It is time, for instance, for a re-examination of 
the 1916 election. Almost every book on America and the First World War discusses the 
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presidential campaign with reference to the Democratic slogan that Wilson ‘kept us out of 
war’ in a way that implies that Wilson’s policy of neutrality was crucial in his re-election.142 
Yet, the American people enthusiastically embraced entering the war just a few months later 
and this contradiction has not been satisfactorily addressed. One might argue after looking 
at the reaction in 1914 that what is surprising about 1916 is how poorly Wilson performed. 
He was a sitting president at a time of international crisis who had presided over two years of 
economic boom. No American president had ever lost under these conditions, indeed such 
economic conditions normally lead to a landslide victory. Yet Wilson only just squeaked by 
his Republican challenger, Charles Evans Hughes. A little less focus on foreign policy and a 
little more Clintonian ‘It’s the Economy Stupid’, and 1916 makes better sense. 
By the end of 1914 the American reaction to the outbreak of the First World War, at 
least as put forward by the nation’s press, had been set. The country would not join in the 
fighting unless it was in the national interest (which it might eventually very well be) and 
meanwhile the country was to do everything possible to benefit economically from the 
ongoing crisis. This view of the American people and press is one that is actually closer to 
the one given by political scientists today than the more general assumptions by historians.  
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